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CHAPTER 8
Summary of Findings
IT is necessary at this point, before summarizing the findings, to repeat
the caution that in their derivation a number of particular assump-
tions were used. Resulting qualifications of the findings, set forth in
detail (especially in Chapters 1, 2, and 4 and Appendix B), serve to
warn the reader of reservations to be kept in mind in, reviewing the
following statements. The brief summary given here is intended only
to underline the major points that emerge either as facts relevant to
tax equity or as conclusions about the significance of the findings.
Each must be interpreted with reference to the foregoing presentations
of the underlying conceptual structure and the interrelations of factors
affecting the income tax burden on stockholders. The findings, there-
fore, are more equivocal than their bald presentation here may suggest.
This brief review begins with a recapitulation of the answers, de-
veloped in the course of the study, to the two questions which marked
its starting point: How heavy has been the extra tax burden on stock-
holders' pro rata share of net corporate earnings? How heavy has been
the extra burden, measured in terms of effective rates on all of stock-
holders' income, compared with that for other taxpayers?
In arriving at an answer to the first question, net corporate earnings
was broken down into two components—earnings for distribution and
earnings for retention. Earnings for distribution, taxed at the corporate
level when earned and the personal level when distributed, is the
segment of net corporate earnings directly involved in the charge of
double taxation. No surprise attaches to the finding that the earnings
for distribution component was subject to heavier taxation in all years
studied and at all income levels than it would have been if reached in
full by the personal income tax alone. But there existed in every year
consistent variations in the height of the extra tax load by income
levels. For the differential against earnings for distribution(i.e., the
net extra burden computed as a per cent of earnings for distribution)
is an inverse function of the marginal rate of personal income tax to
which a stockholder was liable. Therefore, in general, the higher the
level of stockholder income, the lower the differential against earnings
for distribution. At any given income level significant variations were
found from year to year in the relative heaviness of the extra burden
on earnings for distribution, variations determined by the gap between
the corporate and personal rate which changed from year to year. For
reference at various points in the summary, Table 41 gives the flu.
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merical results for 1950. (The reader is referred to Appendix A for
summary data on the range of the value of the differentials over the
period 1940 to 1952.)
TABLE 41
Differentials, 1950, Variant 2






Earnings Earnings Net corporate Stockholder
($000's) for distributionfor retention earnings income
1 34.3 30.0 31.7 5.7
3 34.5 29.1 31.1 6.5
5 33.8 28.8 30.7 6.0
10 32.9 26.0 28.6 9.9
15 32.1 22.0 25.9 9.7
25 29.2 15.2 20.6 9.5
50 24.9 0.4 10.0 5.9
100 19.1 —11.4 0.4 0.3
250 13.2 —26.9 —11.4 —8.7
500 10.0 —32.9 —16.3 —14.3
For the undistributed segment of net corporate earnings—earnings
for retention—the results are more complex. At the lower stockholder
income levels, earnings for retention were found to be overtaxed,
while at the higher income levels they were shown to be undertaxed
in comparison with the potential tax liability on this income segment
had it been subject, in full, to the personal income tax abner (except
in 1940 when overtaxation prevailed at all income levels). The differ-
ential against earnings for retention, being a function of the poten-
tially applicable rate of personal income tax, varied inversely with the
size of stockholder income, and was positive or negative depending on
whether the applicable personal rate fell short of or exceeded the
corporate tax. Evidence on the degree of over- and undertaxation of
this component of net corporate earnings for 1950 appears in Table 41,
and for all years in Appendix A.
The degree of differential taxation of stockholders and the direction
1 Low and high income levels are purely relative in this Connection. The di-
viding line between them, which varied from year to year, occurred at a point
in the income scale usually associated with the upper tail of the distribution.
However, because stockholder income is more highly concentrated than the
come of all taxpayers, the area of undertaxation was not Limited to a minute
segment of the distribution either in terms of number of stockholders involved or,
more particularly, in terms of the fraction of earnings for retention falling in the
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of the differentials on the net corporate earnings component(i.e.,
whether it was overtaxed or undertaxed) depended on the stockholder
income level. Net corporate earnings is the sum of earnings for dis-
tribution and earnings for retention, and the differential against it is
a weighted average of the differential against each of its components.
It was found, like the differentials on both components, to decline as
stockholder income rose, in every year covered by the study. Moreover,
in all but the first two years investigated (1940 and 1941) at some pofnt
on the income scale, the negative differential on earnings for retention
outweighed the differential against earnings for distribution, causing
a shift from over- to undertaxation of net corporate earnings. Thus it
may be concluded that, while in all years of the decade of the forties
and of the early fifties over most of the income scale the net corporate
earnings component of stockholder income was overtaxed, in most
years and for stockholders in the upper reaches of the income scale,
undertaxation was the result.
These findings for the net corporate earnings component apply also
to the total of stockholder income from all sources. But here the value
of the differential is lower since the relationship is between the same
absolute extra burden noted above and a base of income from all
sources of which stockholders' pro rata share of net corporate earnings
is only one component. In all years covered, over most of the income
range, stockholders were subject to a significantly higher rate of
income taxation than would have applied if all their income including
their full pro rata share of net corporate earnings had been subject to
the personal income tax alone. For stockholders near the top of the
income array, however, the outcome was reversed; despite the corpora-
tion income tax, a lower tax liability actually occurred than would
have been due on all their income including their pro rata share of
net corporate earnings under the personal income tax alone. Unlike
the other differentials which followed a smooth pattern of decline
reading up the stockholder income scale, the pattern of the differential
against stockholders starting from the lowest income level, rose to a
peak typically around the $10,000 income level.2 Then it declined
continuously to a cross-over point after which it became negative and
ran increasingly in favor of stockholders as their income rose. The
results emphasize two problems raised in every year of the study except
1940 and 1941 by the existing method of taxing net corporate earnings:
the overtaxation to which most stockholders were subject; and the
undertaxation afforded stockholders at the upper income levels.
2 This is explained by the varying proportion of corporate earnings to the total
of stockholder income(see Chapter 2).
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How are the results modified by alternative assumptions and defini-
tions?
Under an assumption differing from that used in the standard
method, e.g., the assumption that partof thecorporate tax is shifted
rather than that it all rests on corporate earnings, the results sum-
marized above would follow the same general pattern with modifica-
tion of the specific values of the differentials. The extra burden on
corporate earnings (both segments) and stockholders would be lighter;
the positive differentials at applicable income levels would be less
onerous; the negative differentials at income levels above the cross-
over would run more heavily in favor of earnings for retention, net
corporate earnings, and stockholders. The cross-over from burden to
benefit would occur lower down the stockholder income scale. The
larger the proportion of corporate income tax assumed to be shifted,
the more pronounced the difference between the results under the
shifting assumption and the standard method.
Use of a definition of corporate earnings as net of current costs of
maintaining inventory and replacing depreciable assets would lead to
larger extra burdens compared with those summarized above for the
standard method of this study, which accepts the Internal Revenue
Service definition of corporate earnings as, in general, net of historical
costs. In most years covered, especially those characterized by rising
price levels, current cost adjustments for inventory and depreciation
would result in higher differentials against corporate earnings and
stockholders, lower differentials in their favor, and the occurrence of
cross-over points higher up the income scale.
If the shifting assumption and the current costs adjustment were
combined and differentials computed on this basis, the general pattern
resulting would, on net balance, be the same as the standard method's,
but undertaxation would appear further up the income scale, and
the degree of overtaxation would be heavier.
Consideration of only corporate earnings for distribution in ana-
lyzing the differential burden on stockholders led to differentials
against net corporate earnings and stockholders lower at all income
levels than those obtained by the standard procedures in which re-
tained as well as distributed earnings were imputed to stockholders.
The differentials against stockholders in the lower brackets were shown
to be lower, and in the higher brackets to be higher. No cross-over
occurred in this test from extra tax burden to tax benefit at any level
of stockholders income.
How would federal revenue be affected by the abolition of differen-
tial taxation of stockholders?
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corporate tax were abolished and their tax liability were computed
by the same method that now applies to partnerships, i.e., by taxing
their full pro rata share of corporate earnings fully and promptly as
part of personal income. Without judging the desirability or practica-
bility of this method, estimates were made of the effects of such a
change on the federal government's revenue. (The difference in reve-
nue yield may also be construed as the net revenue contribution of
the separate and distinct corporate levy as compared with the alterna-
tive possibility of taxing corporate earnings fully and promptly under
the personal income tax.) By a related set of computations the aggre-
gate extra burden on stockholders was measured.
Detailed estimates were made for 1947, 1949, 1950, and 1952. For
1947, it was found that, given the assumption that the corporate in-
come tax is not shifted, abolition of this tax coupled with the prompt
and full taxation of stockholders' pro rata share of net corporate earn-
ings would have resulted in no immediate loss of revenue to the Treas-
ury. If anything, there might have been a slight revenue gain in that
year. However, because the basis of valuation of stock for computing
capital gains in the future would have been raised by the amount of
imputed undistributed earnings, capital gains tax collections in the
future would have fallen one billion or so short of what they otherwise
would have been. For 1949, the total revenue loss was found to be
heavier. Current revenues would have been lower by about $2 billion,
with an additional $1 billion revenue shortfall showing up in later
years. For 1950 the estimated current decline in revenues would have
been on the order of $3 billion plus a future revenue loss from a lower
capital gains tax liability of about $1.5 billion. For 1952 a heavier
current revenue loss was estimated, $5.7 billion, plus a future revenue
loss of $1 billion. Of greatest contemporary interest is the finding for
1955. (The estimate in this case is less accurate than for the four years
just mentioned.) In 1955 itself the change in the tax treatment of
corporate earnings called for by the partnership method would have
cost the Treasury some $5 billion, with an additional billion and a
quarter of revenue loss via lowered capital gains tax liability showing
up later. To recoup the immediate revenue loss, a rise would have
been required in personal income tax rates of about 3.3 percent-
age points applied to all taxpayers. An analysis limited to taxable
stockholders (those who were reached by the personal income tax)
resulted in a somewhat different picture. In 1950, for example, their
current tax liability would have been only about $600 million lower
under the partnership method. Under this aggregate, however, lay
great diversity in income class experience; the partnership method
would have yielded a lower tax liability, in the aggregate, for stock-
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holders in the imputed gross income classes up to $100,000 and a higher
tax liability in the classes over this level.
Does the corporation income tax increase or decrease the progres.
sivity of the income tax structure?
Investigation of the effect of the corporation income tax on the
progressivity of the income tax structure was necessarily restricted to
stockholders since, under the standard assumption, they are the only
personal income taxpayers affected by the corporation income tax.
Extreme examples found of differential rates of income tax on stock-
holders with the same taxable imputed income led to the conclusion
that, at best, the progressivity effect is very crude because it affects
only stockholders, and it affects unevenly stockholders with similar
total incomes. A further examination restricted to average stockholders
in which this unevenness was averaged out, showed the progressivity
effect to be different under each of two definitions. Under one, the
effect was only partial, greater progressivity over the lower and, in
some years, the middle span of incomes, with the rest of the income
range less progressively taxed than it would have been under the
personal income tax alone. Under the other, there was virtually no
progressivity effect; on the contrary, in almost all cases stockholders
were taxed less progressively than they would have been without the
corporate tax and with their corporate earnings subject in full to the
personal tax.
How do the relief provisions of 1954 affect the income tax burden
of
stockholderrelief provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 were investigated. The two applicable features of the
revised code are the exclusion of the first $50 ($100 for joint returns)
of dividend receipts from taxable income, and a credit against personal
income tax equal to 4 per cent of dividends over the excluded amount.
These provisions were examined first within the context of their
avowed purpose, to alleviate to some extent the double-taxation of
dividends. They were found subject to criticism on the grounds that
they take account only incidentally of the fact that, because personal
income tax rates are progressive, the weight of double-taxation declines
as stockholder income rises. The relief behaves capriciously. Detailed
analysis at selected average stockholder income levels showed the great.
est degree of relief at the bottom and top of the income scale. In
perspective against the background of retained as well as distributed
earnings, the relief provisions moderated overtaxation only slightly
after a point inversely to the rate of overtaxation) while under-
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THIS appendix presents tabulations of the differentials, variants 1, 2,
and 3, annually from 1940 through 1952 with 1942 and 1943 omitted
(Table A-i), and for each of the seven alternative tests conducted with
the 1947 data (Table A-2).
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